This paper suggests how state-owned enterprises can be incorporated into the theoretical and empirical growth literature. Speci…cally, the paper is intended to show that if state-owned enterprises are less e¢cient than private …rms, invest less, employ less skilled labor, and are less eager to adopt new technology, then a large state-enterprise sector tends to be associated with slow economic growth, other things being equal. The empirical evidence for the period 1978-1992 indicates that, through a mixture of these channels, an increase in the share of state enterprises in employment by one standard deviation could reduce per capita growth by one to two percentage points per year from one country to another.
Introduction
The pros and cons of private vs. public enterprise have played an important part in the history of economic ideas, and of the world. State ownership of all factors of production was one of the cornerstones of communism, as practiced in the former Soviet Union and its satellites. Under capitalism, the state has also played a considerable role in economic a¤airs, especially in Europe. Developing countries have been particularly inclined to give the state a prominent role in the production of goods and services and in the allocation of resources to investment and other needs. In 1991, the unweighted average share of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in nonagricultural economic activity in 40 developing countries reporting to the World Bank (1995, Table A2) was 13 The world-wide interest in privatization in recent years rests, among other things, on empirical evidence that seems to indicate that private enterprise is generally more e¢cient than SOEs. This evidence has been reviewed in rich detail by the World Bank (1995) . Phelps (1993) provides a useful classi…cation by suggesting …ve main reasons for the superior e¢ciency of private enterprise. First, private …rms may be more entrepreneurial than SOEs. Second, managers of private …rms may …nd it easier to act on their intuition about what products or production processes will be successful. Third, SOEs may be more susceptible to pressure from interest groups, while private …rms can focus solely on maximizing pro…ts. Fourth, private investors generally have a long time horizon when they acquire assets which can be sold, whereas the electoral assets enjoyed by politicians tend to be more ‡eeting and short-lived. At last, private …rms may …nd it more di¢cult to get public assistance; therefore, the penalty for failing to maximize pro…ts is harsher, and perhaps the fruits of success are also sweeter. In his Presidential Address at the 110 th meeting of the American Economic Association, Harberger (1998, p. 23) airs similar views: "... in most countries state-owned enterprises operate under a series of constraints that seriously get in the way of real cost minimization in a comparative-static sense and real cost reduction in a dynamic sense." Even so, several empirical works and case studies have reported mixed evidence of the relative e¢ciency of public and private …rms. 1 The dearth of unambiguous empirical evidence is not surprising in view of the long-standing and still ongoing debate on the relative merits of public vs. private enterprise, especially when the ine¢ciency that can arise from principal-agent (i.e., owner-manager) relations in private industry is taken into consideration. 2 The government does not have a monopoly on ine¢ciency in production.
But if the transfer of state property to more productive uses in the private sector enhances e¢ciency, by replacing soft budget constraints with harder ones, for example, then it must follow that the composition of corporate ownership should be expected to play a role in generating and sustaining long-term economic growth. This is a direct implication of the theory of endogenous growth: virtually anything that increases static e¢ciency stimulates growth. This result follows particularly clearly from endogenous-growth models featuring constant returns to capital (the so-called AK model where A denotes the output/capital ratio, which may be viewed as a measure of macroeconomic e¢ciency, and K denotes the capital stock). In these models, the long-run rate of growth of output per head equals the multiple of the saving rate, s, and e¢ciency, A, less the depreciation rate, ±: g = sA¡ ±. Any policy undertaking or external event that increases static e¢ciency by increasing the amount of output that can be made from given capital thus also increases the rate of economic growth, permanently. In the neoclassical theory of economic growth, increased e¢ciency also increases economic growth, possibly for a long time, but eventually the rate of growth is restored to its exogenously determined initial equilibrium value. Either way, this link between e¢ciency and growth explains why, for example, education is good for growth. It also explains why liberalization, stabilization, and-yes, why not?-privatization are probably also good for growth.
Which brings us to the question of private vs. public ownership and economic growth. Palia and Phelps (2000) pursue this question by including in their growth regressions an index of private ownership compiled by Milanovic (1989) , and …nd in a sample of 43 countries that a strong private sector is 1 This evidence is reviewed in Stiglitz (1988) . 2 Important contributions to this debate include Vickers and Yarrow (1988) , La¤ont and Tirole (1993) , and Stiglitz (1994) , among others. good for growth. In this paper, we aim to go a step further. In Section 2, we go beyond the AK model to give an example of how e¢ciency can be related to growth by incorporating into an endogenous-growth framework the idea that SOEs generally may be less inclined to invest and employ skilled labor and less innovative than private …rms, in the sense that the SOEs sometimes fail to adopt new products and processes invented in the private sector, and this, among other things, reduces their e¢ciency. In Section 3, we test these hypotheses about the linkages among SOEs, e¢ciency, investment, education, and economic growth on new data from the World Bank (1995) on the share of SOEs in employment in a cross section of 34 developing countries in the period 1978-1992. We …nd a signi…cant inverse relationship between the size of the SOE sector and economic growth, partly through investment and perhaps also education. In Section 4, we summarize our …ndings.
The World Bank (1995) also reports an attempt to …nd a relationship between the size of the SOE sector and economic growth, but without success, because "... there was insu¢cient time-series data on SOE sector size for enough countries over a su¢ciently long time to conduct satisfactory growth regression analysis." (ibid., p. 52). Even so, the World Bank concludes from its analysis that "... the microeconomic evidence, the experience of the centrally planned economies, and the strong negative e¤ect SOEs have on …scal de…cits all collectively support the premise that large SOE sectors can hinder growth. Moreover, because SOE sectors tend to be larger in lowincome countries, SOEs are likely to be most costly in the countries that can least a¤ord them." (ibid., pp. 50-51). On the basis of the empirical …ndings reported in this paper, we concur.
It needs to be emphasized at the outset that the adverse growth e¤ects of state involvement in production and in the allocation of resources must be distinguished from the possible e¤ects of big government on growth. The e¤ects of government spending, taxes, and transfers on growth depend crucially on how the government spends its tax revenue (see Barro 1990) . It is possible for increased government expenditure (on health and education, for example 3 ) to boost growth despite a concurrent negative relationship between the size of the SOE sector and economic growth.
In the next section, we start out by laying out our hypotheses within a clear conceptual framework. This we do in order to be able to discuss some of the various ways in which the form of corporate ownership may a¤ect growth.
As indicated above, a simplistic approach would be to appeal to an AK-type model and let it su¢ce to say that anything that impedes (static) e¢ciency will also impede economic growth (dynamic e¢ciency)-through learning-bydoing, for example. But by appealing to such a simple framework, intuitive though it is, we might be masking more complex interactions that have been debated in the literature on the e¢ciency of SOEs. 4 A more fully articulated model can thus build a bridge between the existing analytical literature on the static e¢ciency of SOEs and the empirical tests of dynamic e¢ciency and economic growth that we will report below. We want to abide by a modeling strategy which rests on microeconomic foundations and permits us thence to derive testable macroeconomic hypotheses, and then to test those hypotheses with new data that have not been applied before to the study of the potential e¤ects of public ownership on economic growth.
A Model with State-owned Enterprises
We now proceed to embed SOEs in one particular model of economic growth.
Our aim is to demonstrate that ownership can matter for growth, and thus belongs in growth theory. Our model is derived from Romer (1990) , where growth arises from an expanding variety of inputs. Since we are planning to test our hypotheses using data from developing countries, it is natural to think of this model in terms of the adoption or imitation of leading-edge technology rather than invention of new technology. The model is intended to illustrate some of the several channels through which e¢ciency in ‡uences economic growth. We do not want to claim that this is an exclusive list, far from it. Instead, our aim is to show by example how SOEs can be incorporated into the growth literature and the by now standard determinants-of-growth regression framework. We do not, however, view our empirical tests in Section 3 as tests of the particular model that we have selected as our vehicle, because we could have chosen other points of entry, such as, for example, the AK model.
In our version of the Romer model, output is produced in both the private and the public sector. The latter includes SOEs, whose output level, like that of the private sector, is set to maximize pro…ts. Unlike private …rms, however, SOEs have to satisfy further constraints and objectives, such as where to buy inputs and regulations on work hours, which a¤ect labor productivity and the propensity to adopt new inputs. We think of these …rms as being run by bureaucrats on whom political authorities have imposed multiple goals and constraints.
Our model features full employment, free entry into the competitive private sector, and in…nite substitutability between private and public output. With free entry, the inherent static and dynamic ine¢ciency of state-owned …rms means that they must be kept a ‡oat by a government subsidy …nanced by a tax on private …rms. So why do SOEs exist? Due to their size, ine¢cient SOEs may be important for the local economy: …rms that employ workers that are not easily employable elsewhere are tempting targets for politicians striving to gain popularity with job-saving measures. SOEs may produce goods and services (e.g., cars and computers, as in France, and banking services, as in India) that are no di¤erent from similar goods and services produced by more competitive, privately owned companies, but cost more to produce. An even stronger motivation for public ownership is provided by the strategic importance of certain industries, such as aircraft, utilities, and armaments. Other examples abound, especially in developing countries where export and import-competing industries are often of paramount importance to the local economy, yet facing sti¤ foreign competition.
In sum, our modelling strategy is intended to draw attention to the potential role of public vs. private ownership in the growth literature and to shed some light on the consequences of SOEs which, while competing with the private sector at home or abroad, are saddled with an ine¢cient cost structure and a social responsibility for the local economy. Even so, our model is merely intended to be illustrative. It is not intended as a general framework for studying the raison d'être of SOEs.
Preferences and Utility Maximization
Consumers derive utility from the consumption of …nal output, which is sold in a perfectly competitive market. Public output Y 
The typical consumer is indi¤erent between consuming private and public output, and maximizes the present discounted value of his lifetime utility from total consumption. As in Blanchard (1985) , workers face a constant probability of death ¼, and new cohorts are continuously being born. This prevents Ricardian Equivalence. This matters because ine¢cient SOEs are often responsible for mounting public debt, which may reduce saving. Preferences are described by an isoelastic utility function, u = c 1¡1=¾ =(1 ¡ 1=¾), where c is per capita consumption and ¾ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This gives the following Euler equation for the optimal aggregate consumption pro…le (C = cL, where L, the total labor force, is …xed):
Here ½ is the pure rate of time preference and W denotes total wealth, which consists of the total value of …rms and outstanding public debt, D. We think of this debt as having been accumulated to sustain the operation of SOEs in the past.
Technology and Pro…t Maximization
Both sectors, private and public, use labor and other inputs, which are produced solely by private …rms. Our description of the production technology in the two …nal-goods sectors takes that of Romer (1990) as a starting point:
is the e¢ciency of labor in that sector, and X i j is the use of input j in sector i, where i = s; p. N is the number of inputs produced and used in the private sector and p is the probability that a new input will be adopted by SOEs. The possible sources of (static) ine¢ciency in the public sector are:
1. Public enterprises may be less e¢cient-i.e., waste more resourcesthan private …rms. This means that A s < A p in equations (2) and (3). Managers of SOEs may not have the same incentive to organize production e¢ciently and to invest in sound projects, partly because the penalty of failure is less threatening when the state co¤ers are within reach and partly also because the rewards of success are typically smaller in SOEs than in private …rms.
2. State …rms may be less e¢cient in organizing the use of labor within the …rm, and may employ less well educated labor than private …rms. Therefore, e s < e p . Public-sector wages are generally lower than wages in the private sector. 6 Also, wage setting in the public sector tends to be less ‡exible and thus less incentive-compatible, i.e., less conducive to increased work e¤ort and improved e¢ciency, than in the private sector; see World Bank (1995) . Moreover, in many countries, the public sector tends to be overmanned because SOEs do not make hiring and …ring decisions solely on the basis of pro…tability. In particular, workers in SOEs generally enjoy greater protection from cyclical layo¤s than workers in the private sector.
3. Each new input is bought by private …rms, but in the public sector this occurs with probability p. Our hypothesis is that SOEs are not as innovative as private …rms-and hence not as likely to invest in new machinery and equipment that embodies new and productive technology (see Phelps 1993) . Thus, there is a …xed probability p · 1 that a new input will be adopted by SOEs. For this reason, there may be fewer types of inputs-less high-tech capital!-used in the public sector than in the private sector: pN < N .
With free entry, private …rms enter until average pro…ts are driven down to zero in that sector. The question of the viability of public enterprises is bound to arise in light of the constant-returns-to-scale nature of the production technology in both sectors. We resolve this issue by assuming that the SOEs receive a subsidy s per unit of output from the government …nanced by a tax t on the output of private …rms. The e¤ective subsidy s + t is then equal to the di¤erence between average long-run costs in public and private enterprises, and can be written as follows for the case of N = 2 and p = 1:
nd P is the real price of an input. We then add the government budget constraint to solve for the subsidies and taxes:
The , then s + t = 0 by equation (4) . This system of taxes and subsidies is the basis for the SOEs' existence, given the presumed ine¢ciency of public enterprises.
Firms in both sectors decide on employment and the use of other inputs in order to maximize pro…ts. The …rst-order conditions for labor (in e¢ciency units) and other inputs are:
where P j is the real price of input j. While the price of inputs is set by monopolists, who have invented them, the wage w is determined by supply and demand in labor markets, so that
where L, the labor force, is …xed.
Input Pricing, Output, and Growth
Each intermediate input is produced by its inventor, who has permanent monopoly in production. The production technology involves turning one unit of the …nal good into a unit of his input at zero cost. His pro…ts can be written as (P j -1)X j where P j is the (monopoly) real price of his input in terms of …nal goods. He then sets the price of the input to maximize current pro…ts by taking the factor demand equations (7) into account; no intertemporal considerations enter his pricing decision. The monopoly price is P j = 1=®. We can now plug this price into the factor demand equations (7) to …nd the steady-state value of a new invention, assuming a constant rate of real interest, r:
In a steady state with a growing variety of inputs and free entry, the expected value of a new invention has to equal the cost of inventing a new input,´.
The total value of …rms is, therefore, equal to N´. This gives the equilibrium interest rate and, through equation (1), the rate of economic growth:
where , and the rate of time preference, ½, on growth, we also …nd that:
1. The rate of growth is a decreasing function of the relative size of the state sector, v, as long as
, because the transfer of labor from the private sector to the state sector decreases the demand for inputs. Thus, A p (1 ¡ t)¸A s (1 + s) and e p¸es is a su¢cient, but not a necessary, condition for an expansion of the SOE sector from one time or place to another to reduce economic growth, as long as p < 1. This is our main hypothesis. 4. The rate of growth is an increasing function of the probability that state …rms adopt newly invented inputs, p, which we interpret as a sign of their willingness to invest.
5. The rate of growth is a decreasing function of public debt, D, which we assume to have been, at least in part, accumulated by SOEs in the past. A higher level of debt increases consumption and hence leaves less output for investment in research and development of new types of inputs.
Empirical Evidence
Under ideal conditions, our next task would be to gather the necessary data and then test all the hypotheses that we have derived from our growth equation (9) . This is an impossible task, however, because several of the variables that drive economic growth in our model cannot be directly observed: specifically, the e¢ciency of organization (A s
, for which we have data from the World Bank (1995), and economic growth, controlling for other potential determinants of growth. If our conjecture that this correlation is negative is con…rmed, we take that as an indication that the SOE sector is less well organized or less e¢cient or less innovative than the private sector in such proportions that
1¡® . For lack of data, however, we can test hypotheses 2-5 only indirectly. To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we assume labor productivity and e¢ciency of organization to vary directly with investment and the education of the labor force. To test hypothesis 4, we assume that the propensity to invest re ‡ects, in part, also the willingness to adopt newly invented inputs. This is the case when the intermediate inputs are capital goods. Therefore, if SOEs are generally more prone than private …rms to waste resources on unproductive investments ("white elephants") and to divert government spending away from social needs, including education (Mauro 1998) , and less willing to adopt new inputs, as we conjecture, then we have here an additional link between the size of the SOE sector and economic growth. Together, hypotheses 1-4 imply that increased SOE activity can hurt economic growth directly as well as indirectly through investment and education. We further hypothesize that the impact of investment on growth varies inversely with the size of the SOE sector. To test hypothesis 5, at last, we assume that SOEs bear responsibility for a substantial part of public external indebtedness. Our empirical results reported below need to be viewed in the light of these quali…cations.
A Preview
We use cross-sectional data from the Penn World Tables and the World Data Bank. The data cover the period 1978-1992 (except the data on SOEs, which reach from 1978 to 1991). In Table 1 we report summary statistics for the share of SOEs in employment (SOE=Labor) and in nonagricultural GDP (SOE=GDP ) as well as for the external debt of SOEs as a proportion of GDP (SOE=Debt). In our sample, the share of SOEs in employment was remarkably steady over the period under study: it averaged 12 per cent in the …rst year and also in the last year of the period. 7 Chile undertook a signi…cant downsizing of its SOE sector, reducing its share in employment from 4 per cent to 1 per cent and its share in nonagricultural GDP from 12 per cent to 8 per cent during the period under study. Likewise, Argentina reduced its SOE sector's employment share from 4 per cent to 2 per cent and its share in GDP from 6 per cent to 2 per cent. Botswana also moved in the same direction: there the SOE sector's share in employment fell from 3 per cent to 2 per cent, while its share in GDP fell from 9 per cent to 6 per cent over the same period. At the other end of the spectrum, Ghana increased the SOEs' share in employment from 29 per cent to 45 per cent, while their share in GDP actually decreased from 8 per cent to 7 per cent.
It would be unwise, however, without further ado, to ascribe rapid growth in Chile since the mid-1980s and in Argentina since the early 1990s in part to privatization (or, for that matter, to ascribe slow growth in Ghana in part to the failure to privatize) because, for one thing, as always, causation can run both ways. While our model suggests a link from privatization to growth, and privatization was an important ingredient of the reforms that started in Chile in the 1970s and in Argentina in the 1980s, it also seems reasonable to suppose that brisk growth in Chile and Argentina may have helped create conditions that were favorable to further privatization and other reforms. Even so, this reverse linkage from growth to privatization seems likely to have been weakened by the fact that rapid growth in Chile and Argentina has been accompanied by high unemployment, which exerted political pressure on the authorities not to endanger jobs in the state sector. By the same token, sluggish growth and high unemployment in Ghana and elsewhere no doubt contributed to the expansion of employment in the SOE sector during the period under review, even if that sector's share in GDP was declining.
The main point, however, is this: If private enterprise is good for growth, as we hypothesize, that does not mean that growth is not good for private enterprise. The same argument applies pari passu to other potential determinants of economic growth: trade, investment, education, and so on. In what follows, we choose to emphasize the link from privatization to growth, but we are aware that the relationship between the two may well be more complex.
Correlation Analysis
Let us …rst look at some bivariate correlations among the key variables in our story: the relative size of the state sector, which we measure by the SOEs' share of employment (SOE=Labor), and the accumulation of physical and human capital-two key determinants of economic growth. Figure 1 shows a scatterplot of SOE employment and the share of investment in GDP across countries, both measured as averages over the period under review, 1978-1991/92. 8 The pattern observed is economically and statistically signi…cant. The regression line superimposed on the scatterplot in Figure 1 is based on robust estimation in order to reduce the weight of potential outliers (the same applies to Figures 2-3 ). An increase in the employment share of SOEs by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in investment by 4 1 2 per cent of GDP, all else being the same. The correlation r is ¡0:51 (t = 3:6). Similar results obtain when we measure SOE=Labor by its initial value rather than the average (r = ¡0:42, t = 2:9). This suggests that the causation runs from SOE=Labor to investment rather than the other way round. Thus, Figure 1 supports the idea that SOEs are less inclined than private …rms to invest in new machinery and equipment and to adopt new technology, and may thus impede economic growth.
[ Figure 1 ] Figure 2 shows a scatterplot of SOE employment during 1978-1991 and the rate of enrolment in secondary schools in the base year, 1978, a commonly used measure of education in the growth literature. An increase in the employment share of SOEs by one standard deviation goes along with a decrease in secondary-school enrolment by 1 1 2 percentage points, other things being equal. The correlation is ¡0:58 (t = 4:1). Again, a similar pattern emerges when we measure SOE=Labor by its initial value rather than the average (r = ¡0:51, t = 3:4). This pattern seems consistent with the idea that SOEs are less inclined than private …rms to employ skilled labor and perhaps also less likely to adopt new technology, and may thus inhibit economic growth. Other interpretations are also conceivable; for example, low standards of education may generate unemployment, and thus exert pressure on the authorities to create jobs through SOEs.
[ Figure 2] In sum, the data suggest that SOEs may slow down economic growth by discouraging investment (Figure 1 ) and education ( Figure 2) . Figure 3 con…rms this: it shows an inverse correlation between the SOEs' employment share and economic growth across countries. The correlation is ¡0:35 (t = 2:2). An increase in the SOEs' employment share by one standard deviation is associated with a decrease in the annual rate of economic growth by about 1 per cent. The economic and statistical signi…cance of this correlation is preserved when economic growth is regressed on the SOEs' employment share and initial GDP by OLS, and also when we measure SOE=Labor by its initial value rather than the average (r = ¡0:29, t = 1:8). Figure 3 suggests that a small SOE sector can go along with rapid growth (as in Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia) and with slow or even negative growth (as, e.g., in Madagascar, Peru, and Bolivia). On the other hand, the …gure also indicates that a large SOE sector generally goes hand in hand with slow growth (as in Ghana and Zambia). With the sole exception of Sri Lanka, no country with an SOE sector accounting for 10 per cent or more of total employment had economic growth of 2 per cent per year or more on average over the period; they all grew more slowly than that (a majority of them, in fact, had negative growth). Notice also that in the range where the SOE sector accounts for 5 per cent or less of total employment, there is no discernible relationship between its size and economic growth in Figure  3 . When the SOE sector accounts for more than 5 per cent of employment, however, its expansion tends to inhibit economic growth.
The reader may wonder whether the inverse correlation between the employment share of SOEs and economic growth can be traced to ine¢ciency in the SOE sector, as we hypothesize, or whether the size of the SOE sector simply re ‡ects ‡aws in economic policy, thus hindering economic growth. If the latter is the case, we would expect the share of SOEs in employment to be positively correlated with in ‡ation, a common measure of policy failures. This is not the case, however, for the correlation between our SOE variable (SOE=Labor) and a measure of the in ‡ation distortion (de…ned as
where ¼ is the rate of in ‡ation) in our sample is ¡0:31 (t = 1:9).
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[ Figure 3] Now we need to ascertain whether the simple correlations among the size of the state sector, investment, education, and growth reviewed above survive closer econometric scrutiny.
Regression Analysis
We estimate our model as a system. 10 The reason is that we want to model the marginal processes for investment, education, and growth simultaneously and estimate them jointly to investigate the direct and indirect e¤ects of SOEs on economic growth. However, we start with a basic Barrovian growth regression explaining the growth rate alone.
[ Table 2 ] Column (1) in Table 2 shows the results of a cross-sectional OLS regression of average growth on the logarithm of the initial level of GDP and the average share of investment in GDP. The negative coe¢cient on initial income (although not statistically signi…cant) is a sign of¯-convergence, but quite slow: it implies a speed of convergence of approximately 0.3 per cent per year compared with the usual 2-3 per cent convergence rate found in the literature (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). However, this result is in line 9 The correlation between SOE=Labor and the share of government expenditure in GDP in our sample is 0.48 (t = 3.2), but government expenditure is not in itself a sign of policy weakness or ine¢ciency, certainly not if the government spends its tax revenue mostly on productive infrastructure, education, and health care. 10 The estimation method used is SUR. We also estimated the models independently by OLS (not reported). The results remained virtually the same.
with other studies when variables such as human capital, trade, political instability, etc., are not included.
The higher the share of investment in GDP, the more rapid is economic growth in all our regressions; this e¤ect is quite robust. Increasing the investment ratio from 20 to 30 per cent from one country to another increases growth by 1.3 to 2.1 per cent, ceteris paribus, according to our point estimates. These estimates are broadly similar to those reported by Levine and Renelt (1992) , Sachs and Warner (1995) , Gylfason and Herbertsson (1996) , and Gylfason (1999).
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Our exclusive focus on developing countries, where diminishing returns to capital have not yet set in fully, may explain why investment in some cases appears to have a bit stronger e¤ect on growth in our sample than it has, for example, in some of the above-mentioned studies (Sachs and Warner, in particular), which include industrial as well as developing countries.
In column (2a), our education variable is the usual secondary-school enrolment rate from Barro and Lee (1993) , measured at the beginning of our sample period (1978), as is customary, in order to avoid simultaneity bias. The e¤ect of education on growth is statistically signi…cant, and also economically: an increase in the initial secondary-school enrolment rate from 50 to 80 per cent increases the average rate of growth by almost a whole percentage point, ceteris paribus. Equation (2a) is estimated as part of a system of three equations where equations (2b) and (2c) describe the dependence of investment and secondary education on initial income and the share of SOEs in employment (recall Figures 1 and 2 ). An increase in SOE employment discourages both investment and education by equations (2b) and (2c)-the latter only marginally, however-and thus reduces growth by equation (2a). The total indirect effect of an increase in the SOEs' employment share on economic growth is 0:131 £ (¡0:267) + 0:029 £ (¡0:419) = ¡0:035 ¡ 0:012 = ¡0:047 (t = 2:5).
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The indirect e¤ect of SOEs on growth through investment is statistically signi…cant (t = 2:1), but the indirect e¤ect through education is not (t = 1:3). The composite t-values are computed by Taylor expansion following Staiger, Stock, and Watson (1997). 13 Notice also that the total e¤ect of initial income on growth is, by similar artihmetic, smaller than the direct e¤ect, as is reasonable: conditional convergence does not necessarily generate absolute convergence.
When we use initial rather than average values of the SOE=Labor variable to be on guard against the possibility of reverse causation and omitted-variable bias, a broadly similar pattern emerges. This reduces the likelihood that our results are driven by the e¤ects of economic growth and investment on the size of the SOE sector (e.g., growth slowdowns that make governments more willing to expand SOE employment or investment booms that make SOE employment and growth increase simultaneously.)
In column (3a), we add the multiple of the employment share of the SOEs and the investment ratio to the regression to test for the direct impact of SOE=Labor on growth. This makes the e¤ect of investment on growth dependent on the size of the SOE sector. The idea is that SOEs tend to buy inferior capital which adds less to output. The coe¢cient on the SOE=Labor term is signi…cant, and implies that an increase in SOE=Labor by one Therefore, when the share of SOEs in employment increases by one standard deviation, economic growth decreases by 2.4 percentage points, ceteris paribus, directly as well as through investment. The indirect growth effect of SOEs through investment is economically and statistically signi…cant (t = 2:2), but the indirect e¤ect through education is not (t = 0:5). The visual impression conveyed by Figures 1 and 3 is con…rmed. Again, when we use initial rather than average values of the SOE=Labor variable, a broadly similar pattern is observed: the total e¤ect of an increase in SOE employment on growth is now ¡0:123 (t = 2:5).
Thus far, we have measured the size of the SOE sector by its share in total employment rather than by its share in GDP. This is because the inef…ciency associated with SOEs often manifests itself in too much sta¤ (recall the case of Ghana, where the share of SOEs in employment rose by one-half 14 When SOE=Labor appears as an independent variable on its own in equation (3a), without interacting with investment, its direct e¤ect on growth is still negative, but not signi…cant (t = 1:1). In other respects, the results remain virtually unchanged. during 1978-1991, while their share in GDP declined). It is, nevertheless, of interest to see whether there is a signi…cant relationship between the share of SOEs in GDP (SOE=GDP ) and economic growth. Equation (4a) shows that an increase in the share of SOEs in GDP has a signi…cantly negative direct e¤ect on economic growth. This result holds also when we use initial rather than average values of SOE=GDP . There are no indirect e¤ects, however, at least not through education; see column (4c). True, the coe¢-cient on SOE=GDP in the investment equation in column (4b) is marginally signi…cant in a statistical sense, but its sign is wrong in view of our model. Even if we contemplate the possibility that an increase in the share of SOEs in GDP stimulates investment, the total e¤ect of SOE=GDP on growth is still signi…cantly negative.
When, at last, we include the external debt of SOEs as a proportion of GDP (SOE=Debt) in the growth regression in accordance with the …fth and last hypothesis listed at the end of Section 2.3, we obtain the OLS results shown in column (5). 15 The debt variable has a signi…cant and sizable negative e¤ect on growth: an increase in SOE=Debt by one standard deviation reduces growth by a bit more than half a percentage point. 16 We take this measure of external debt to be a proxy for total SOE debt-for want of a direct measure-and hence also for domestic debt, which appears in equation (10) . Thus, the results in column (5) provide some support for the hypothesis that increased indebtedness by SOEs inhibits economic growth. In other respects, regression (5) is similar to regression (2a), except the estimate of the e¤ect of schooling on growth is no longer signi…cant.
Conclusion
We have presented a simple model of endogenous growth in an economy with state-owned enterprises as well as private …rms. In our model, if state enterprises are less e¢cient than private …rms, invest less, employ less skilled labor, and are less eager to adopt new technology, then a large state sector tends to be associated with slow economic growth, other things being equal. Our main empirical …nding is that, across countries, investment and economic growth during 1978-1992 were inversely related to the size of the 15 When we use SUR, the growth regression and the auxiliary regressions for investment and education are almost identical to regressions (5), (3b), and (3c), and are not reported. 16 This result holds also when we use initial rather than average values of SOE=Debt.
state-enterprise sector, measured by its share of total employment. Speci…-cally, we …nd that an increase in the state sector's share of total employment by one standard deviation from one country to another reduces the ratio of investment to GDP by about four percentage points and reduces per capita growth by about one to two percentage points, ceteris paribus. We conclude that an excessive reliance on state-owned enterprises may stand in the way of, or possibly even sti ‡e, both static and dynamic e¢ciency-and consequently also investment and economic growth. Even so, our results need to be taken with a grain of salt in view of the limited coverage of the available data across space and time.
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